

# Workshop eSanté

## WS 1: Architecture & Security

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
## **Overview Platform Proposal**


- Introduction, Typical Workflow
- Access Control
- Pseudonymization and 2-step Encryption
- Re-Encryption and 2-step Decryption

## **Workshop**

- **Relevant Topics to be discussed ?**
- **Your Expectations ?**


- Provide Data
- Request Data
- Receive Data






1. Pre-registered PERSON / INSTITUTION
2. Pre-registered PLATFORM USER with ROLE

## General “Medical Report” + extraction of Metadata




## Data Provider side




- A** Extract Identity Data and Metadata
- B** Generate a Symmetric Key (for each document)
- C** Encrypt Report with Symmetric Key
- D** Encrypt Symmetric Key with TTP's Public Key
- E** Provide Identity Data to TTP
- F** Provide "everything else" to TTP
- G** Pseudonym Handshake

\* TTP = Trusted Third Party, PMIP = Pseudonymized Medical Information Provider, **M** = Metadata



- 1 Open Query Session
- 2 Pseudonym Handshake
- 3 Re-Encryption of [lock icon] with public Key of Requester
- 4 Deliver Encrypted Report and Key
- 5 Decryption in 2 Steps
- 6 Check Patient's Identity on Report



Metadata is protected by **Pseudonymization**  
Medical Reports are protected by full **Encryption**  
**Non-Disclosure** against single Admin/Intruder  
Non-Disclosure even during **Re-Encryption** !




## Workshop

– **Relevant Topics to be discussed ?**

– **Your Expectations ?**

- TTP's Public Keys ... or ...
- Signature PKI mimics costly Encryption PKI
- Central and De-central Repositories
- Alerts and Access Logs
- Scheduled Pseudonym Exchange
- Multiple Pseudonymization
- Reduced Security Features for 1<sup>st</sup> Realization (?)
- Extension for Statistical Usage


## Data Provider side




About this public key...

... and its corresponding private key at TTP

# Signature PKI vs. Crypto PKI (provide)





## Learned:

When using POP mechanisms

... a signature PKI can simulate a (temp) crypto PKI

## The benefit:

- Signature PKI is already provided by Luxtrust and others
- Crypto PKI is more cost intensive because of Backups

## Remark:

- Backups of signatures' private keys are forbidden  
(non-repudiation of electronic signatures)

## Results of Workshop-Discussion:

Proposed (temp) encryption keys acceptable?

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Resulting “Multi-TTP-Key” solution sufficient for security?


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Other ideas, other remarks?


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## IHE XDS

central




de-central



Picture source: IHE International. IHE Profiles. URL: <http://www.ihe.net/profiles/>

## Proposed Platform





## Results of Workshop-Discussion:

Opinion: Will laboratories, hospitals, home care organization, etc. offer “De-Central” Repositories?

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Should a commercial provider offer “De-Central” Repositories?  
→ protection against governmental access  
(Beschlagnahmeschutz?)

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Other ideas, other remarks?

## Logging

- Logging of every access, read and write.
- On demand: yearly access report for patient
- Online inspection for logging by patient.

## Alerts

- Emergency access sends out an information to a relative of the patient (SMS, eMail, ...)

**“I allow access to my data for samu and my\_family\_GP  
in case of an\_emergency\_situation  
to all\_diagnoses and all\_medication  
but only of the last 6 years.”**

**“In case of emergency motivated access to my folder,  
a message containing the accessing emergency unit (hospital)  
Should be send to <patients.brother@his-company.lu>  
and per SMS to <+352 66123456>  
and .... “**

## Results of Workshop-Discussion:


Switch Alert ON with Consent Declaration?


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Other ideas, other remarks?


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# Scheduled Pseudonym Exchange






# Combination of Both (SPE, MP)




... or with different intervals

Data Provider side




No Pseudonymization







- No Pseudonymization, and
- Documents are disclosed during Re-Encryption



- No Pseudonymization, and
- No (Public-User-Key) Encryption, only VPN line encryption

- *Stripped fragments of the CDA documents*
- *Fragments without any person identifying data*
- *Same Pseudonymization Technique*
- *Allowance necessary (Law, Ethic commission, etc.)*





## Results of Workshop-Discussion:

Opinions about

- Scheduled Pseudonym Exchange (SPE)
  - Multi-Pseudonymization (MP)
  - Combination of SPE and MP
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## Results of Workshop-Discussion:

Opinions about

- NO Pseudonymization
  - “Inhouse” Re-Encryption (Disclosure for Admin / Intruder)
  - NO Encryption, i.e. only HealthNet / VPN line encryption
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## Results of Workshop-Discussion:

Opinions about

– Stripped Fragments for Statistical Usage

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- Other Topics, other remarks?